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FACTS 
 
Following the felling, by aircraft, of the twin towers of the New York 
World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, Western democracies have each 
passed a raft of ‘anti-terrorist’ or security legislation consistently criticised for 
breaching human and civil rights. On February 23rd 2007 the Canadian 
Supreme Court unanimously determined that provisions of Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act 2001 (Canada) purporting to protect citizens from 
terrorism and terrorists infringe the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
‘the Charter’).1 Albeit not going as far as the Applicants wished, the decision 
is an affirmation that governments and parliaments do not have carte blanche 
for restricting the rights of persons within a state’s borders in the name of 
protection and security. 
In Charkaoui and others,2 Adil Charkaoui, a Morrocan national, 
spent 21 months in jail under a ministerial security certificate as a suspected 
terrorist.3 The Supreme Court denied constitutional validity of elements of a 
scheme established by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (‘the 
Act’) giving the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of 
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness power to issue certificates 
∗ Barrister & Human Rights Lawyer, Owen Dixon Chambers, 205 William Street, 
Melbourne, Victoria 3000.  
1 Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 (23 February 
2007), Docket 30762, 30929, 31178. 
2 Ibid. 
3 ‘Adil Charkaoui was a permanent resident when, in May 2003, he was arrested and 
stated to be inadmissible under a certificate issued by the authorized ministers, and 
upheld by the designated judge of the Federal Court, on the basis of information that 
was partly secret. The portion of the evidence that was disclosed included an 
identification of Mr Charkaoui by persons who were probably involved in the Al-
Qaeda network’ (Adil Charkaoui v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, et al). 
CASE COMMENTARY 
 252
                                                     
declaring foreign nationals or permanent residents inadmissible to Canada on 
security grounds. A person named in such a certificate could be detained 
indefinitely, albeit the detention was subject to review. For a permanent 
resident, the review was required within 48 hours. For a foreign national, 
automatic detention was subject to review but only after (a) a judge had 
determined that the certificate was ‘reasonable’; and (b) 120 days had elapsed 
after that judicial determination was made. No appeal or judicial review of the 
judge’s determination on the reasonableness of the certificate was allowed. 
Further, if the judge found the certificate to be reasonable, it became a 
removal order unable to be appealed against and immediately enforceable. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
 
Under the certificate and detention review process, a person could be 
deprived of some or all information on the basis of which the certificate was 
issued or detention ordered. This was the first basis for the Court’s 
determination of breach of the Charter.  Chief Justice McLachlin, with whom 
Justices Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and 
Rothstein agreed, commenced by observing that one of “the most fundamental 
responsibilities of a government is to ensure the security of its citizens.”4 This 
may mean a government must “act on information that it cannot disclose and 
… detain people who threaten national security.”5 However, added 
McLachlin, in a constitutional democracy “governments must act accountably 
and in conformity with the Constitution and the rights and liberties it 
guarantees.” 
 
“These two propositions describe a tension that lies at the 
heart of modern democratic governance. It is a tension that 
must be resolved in a way that respects the imperatives both 
of security and of accountable constitutional governance.”6  
 
McLachlan determined that the Act ‘unjustifiably’ violated sections 7, 9 
and 10 (c) of the Charter: 
 
• by allowing issuances of a certificate of inadmissibility based on 
secret material without providing for an independent agent at the 
stage of judicial review to better protect the named person’s interests; 
4 Ibid, para 1. 
5 Ibid, para 1. 
6 Ibid, para 1. 
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• by incorporating arbitrary time limits in the provisions for continuing 
detention of a foreign national. 
 
Neither the equality right (s. 15) nor section 12 (‘cruel and unusual 
punishment’) of the Charter was determined to be violated, “since a 
meaningful detention review process offers relief against the possibility of 
indefinite detention.”7
 
Charter Violation – Section 7 
 
 Section 7 of the Charter provides that everyone “has the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” Both the 
procedure for determining whether a certificate is reasonable, and that in 
relation to the detention, were held to ‘fail to ensure the fair hearing’ required 
by section 7 before the state deprives a person of the right to life, liberty  and 
security.  
The Court held, amongst other matters, that albeit deportation of a non-
citizen may not in itself breach section 7, features relating to the deportation 
may.  A feature breaching section 7 was the restriction on disclosure of 
information to the person against whom a certificate was issued: 
 
“Under the [Act], the government effectively decides what 
can be disclosed to the named person. Not only is the named 
person not shown the information and not permitted to 
participate in proceedings involving it, but no one but the 
judge may look at the information with a view to protecting 
the named person’s interests.”8
 
McLachlan questioned why drafters of the Act “did not provide for 
special counsel to objectively review the material with a view to protecting 
the named person’s interests,” pointing out that this was formerly done for 
review of security certificates and is presently done in the United Kingdom: 
 
“The special counsel system may not be perfect from the 
named person’s perspective, given that special counsel 
cannot reveal confidential material. But, without 
7 Ibid, para 3. 
8 Ibid, para 86. 
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compromising security, it better protects the named person’s 
s. 7 interests.”9
 
This was not, however, the only issue. The scheme of the Act not only 
circumscribed the person, the subject of the certificate, or detention. As well, 
it placed judges in an invidious position, limiting their capacity for decision-
making. Judges were required to make determinations without the benefit of 
the adversary system, albeit it is that system which purportedly governs the 
review process and is fundamental to the justice system. If full information is 
not disclosed to the subject person, or at least to special counsel as the Court 
decided it should be, the judge is deprived of any critical analysis or 
questioning of the material put forward to justify issue of a certificate or 
imposition of detention. There will be no cross-examination of those 
providing the information, no countering evidence, and no possibility for 
contradiction. There can be no useful challenge to it. Hence, both the rights of 
the subject person and proper operation of the justice system in itself could 
not sustain the procedure. The Court determined that the government and 
Parliament should have 12 months in which to review this aspect and amend 
the legislation so as to comply with the requirements of section 7 of the 
Charter. 
 
Charter Violation – Sections 9 and 10(c) 
 
Section 9 of the Charter says: “Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained or imprisoned.” Section 10(c) provides that everyone “has the right 
on arrest or detention … to have the validity of the detention determined by 
way of habeas corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.” 
The Court held that automatic detention of foreign nationals was not 
arbitrary on the ground of its being effected without regard to the personal 
circumstances of the detainee: 
 
“Detention is not arbitrary where there are ‘standards that are 
rationally related to the purpose of the power of detention’ … 
The triggering event for the detention of a foreign national is 
the issuing of a certificate stating that the foreign national is 
inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or 
international rights, serious criminality or organised 
criminality. The security ground is based on the danger posed 
9 Ibid, para 86. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
255 
                                                     
by the named person, and therefore provides a rational 
foundation for the detention.”10
 
However, the Court held that the 120 day limitation imposed on foreign 
nationals was arbitrary, so breaching the Charter. The Court made the obvious 
point that if permanent residents against whom a certificate has issued have a 
right to an automatic review within 48 hours, there could be no justification 
for setting 120 days for foreign nationals. The Court said it was clear “there 
may be a need for some flexibility in regarding the period for which a 
suspected terrorist may be detained”: 
 
“Confronted with a terrorist threat, state officials may need to 
act immediately, in the absence of a fully documented case. It 
may take some time to verify and document the threat. Where 
state officials act expeditiously, the failure to meet an 
arbitrary target of a fixed number of hours should not mean 
the automatic release of the person, who may well be 
dangerous. However, this cannot justify the complete denial 
of a timely detention review. Permanent residents who pose a 
danger to national security are also meant to be removed 
expeditiously. If this objective can be pursued while 
providing permanent residents with a mandatory detention 
review within 48 hours, then how can a denial of review for 
foreign nationals for 120 days after the certificate is 
confirmed be considered a minimal impairment?”11  
 
The Court struck the 120-day provision, and modified the Act so as to 
allow for review of the detention of a foreign national both before and after 
the certificate has been deemed reasonable. 
 
No Charter Violation – Sections 12 and 15 
 
Section 12 provides that everyone has “the right not to be subjected to any 
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment”. Section 15 holds every 
individual as “equal before and under the law” with the right to “the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability”. Like the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
10 Ibid, para 89. 
11 Ibid, para 93. 
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Charter specially allows for differential treatment of citizens and non-citizens 
in matters relating to immigration: unlike the UN Convention, section 6 of the 
Charter limits this to deportation matters: only citizens are accorded the right 
to enter, remain in and leave Canada. Therefore, the Court held that a 
deportation scheme applying to non-citizens and not to citizens “does not, for 
that reason alone, violate s 15 of the Charter …”12  
The argument was that the Act could in some circumstances result in 
discrimination: 
 
• Detention may become indefinite with deportation being put off or 
becoming impossible if, for example, there is no country to which a 
person can be deported; 
• The government could ‘conceivably use the [Act] not for the purpose 
of deportation, but to detain the person on security ground’.13  
 
In both situations, detention would no longer be related, “in effect or 
purpose, to the goal of deportation.”14
The court acknowledged the decision in A v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department,15 where the English House of Lords considered legislation 
expressly providing for indefinite detention, which was held to go beyond the 
concerns of immigration legislation, so wrongfully discriminating between 
nationals and non-nationals.  
In the present case, however, the Court decided that albeit some appellants 
had been held for a long time in detention, and detention was continuing for 
one, “the record on which we must rely does not establish that the detentions 
at issue have become unhinged from the state’s purpose of deportation.”16 
Further, the Court said that ‘more generally’, the concerns here raised would 
be answered in an effective review process permitting all relevant matters to 
be considered by the judge. This was dealt with by the Court’s earlier holding 
as to this aspect. 
As to section 12 of the Charter, the Court held that extended periods of 
detention under the Act’s certificate provisions would not be cruel and 
unusual punishment so long as accompanied by “a process that provides 
regular opportunities for review of detention, taking into account all relevant 
factors,”17 including: 
 
12 Ibid, para 4. 
13 Ibid, para 130. 
14 Ibid, para 130. 
15 [2005] 3 All ER 169, [2004] UKHL 56. 
16 Charkaoui, ibid, para 131. 
17 Ibid, para 3, 110. 
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• reasons for detention; 
• length of detention; 
• reasons for delay in deportation; 
• anticipated future length of detention; and 
• availability of alternatives to detention: 
  
Breach of Rule of Law – Subsumed within Charter Breach/Non-Breach 
 
As to arguments that the Act breached the rule of law, the Court held that 
the provisions of the Charter covered any principle that might be characterised 
as a breach of the rule of law. No breach of the rule of law beyond the 
breaches of the Charter had occurred. It was ‘hard to see’, said the Court, 
‘what rule of law could add to’ the Charter provisions, insofar as relating to 
the issues in the case. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the past, during the glory days of the Warren Court, the United States 
Supreme Court could be looked to in the advancement and protection of civil 
rights. The European Court of Justice now plays a more significant role. The 
Canadian Supreme Court, too, is rapidly overtaking its neighbour in providing 
hope to litigants and lawyers concerned about the rapid rise of restrictive and 
human and civil rights denying laws and policies in countries which once 
moved forward progressively on these fronts. Albeit the outcome could have 
been more favourable to the appellants, the decision stands as a beacon 
against the passage and implementation of repressive laws denying just 
processes and, hence, just outcomes, to non-citizens. In so doing, it affirms 
also that even if governments and Parliaments (increasingly under the control 
of the executive) renounce civil liberties and human rights, the judiciary may 
retain the capacity for travelling in the other direction. 
 
